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 We live in an imperfect world populated by imperfect characters. We frequently 
interact with others who do not share our moral attitude about the conditions that 
make collective engagements possible.1 An especially acute instance is when we 
encounter people cheating. As the ordinary sense of the term indicates, cheating 
implies that someone is being harmed or put at an unfair disadvantage, typically 
through deceptive means, and when we are involved we may wonder what we can or 
should do about it. 
 This essay explores cheating in sport through the lens of non-cheating participants 
in an athletic contest. Parts II and III of this essay focus on the non-cheater’s 
experience of the contest and the mens rea and actus reus in the context of sport 
cheating. Parts IV and V outline and defend the concept and implications of “playable 
cheating,” which holds that contests can often proceed despite rule violations. Parts 
VI and VII discuss how cheating impacts non-cheating teammates and non-cheating 
opponents, and Part VIII concludes with some final remarks. Although this essay 
focuses on the athletic arena, the dynamic has parallels beyond sport, often with 
legal implications.
II. THE INDIRECT PROBLEM OF CHEATING
 Cheating inherently involves a general moral and legal problem, of which sport 
provides a particularly interesting case. While it is true that the world of sport is 
somewhat contrived and separate from the larger moral universe, competitive sport is 
an interpersonal engagement that requires cooperation and trust for its activity.2 
Despite its playful character, many people consider sport to be a serious and 
meaningful enterprise worthy of their time and devotion, and central to their sense 
of who they are. Most participants and observers share the intuition that cheating is 
inconsistent with the very nature of sport, even if it is unclear what constitutes 
cheating, or the sense in which it is wrong.3
1. “Collective engagements” refer to any group activity or interaction that is governed by authoritative 
rules or ethical guidelines. This includes games or sports, co-workers collaborating in a professional 
setting, or even citizens participating in a community. The responsibilities of participants who encounter 
instances of cheating will vary according to the nature of the engagement.
2. Participants in sport confront “unnecessary obstacles,” which seems to diminish the moral seriousness of 
the rules within that world. See Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia 39 
(Univ. of Toronto Press 1978). In this seminal work, Suits offered a now classic definition of games, 
namely, the “voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles.” Id. at 41. Suits argues that games 
are deliberately designed to make the achievement of certain goals difficult, which is what provides the 
satisfaction in their accomplishment. Id. at 38; see also R. Scott Kretchmar, The Nature and Value of 
Sporting Tests and Contests, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 219, 223 (2018–2019).
3. See J.S. Russell, Is There a Normatively Distinctive Concept of Cheating in Sport (or Anywhere Else)?, 41 J. 
Phil. Sport 303, 304 (2014) (“[D]escribing some behavior as cheating is typically little more than 
expressing strong, but thoroughly vague and imprecise, moral disapproval or condemnation of another 
person or institution about a wide and ill-defined range of improper advantage-seeking behavior.”); see 
also What Can Law Teach Sport and Sport Teach Law(yers)? A Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Sport, 63 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119, 149–51 (2018–2019) (discussing the definition of cheating).
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 Although the relationships and stakes may be different, life outside of sport has 
its fair share of cheaters, and behavioral guidelines exist, with penalties and 
punishments attached to transgressions in both sport and the social order beyond.4 
We might witness problematic behavior and worry how it threatens or possibly 
implicates us. Indeed, the mere fact of witnessing something problematic is troubling, 
especially if the cheater knows he is being watched.
 Most of the sport literature approaches the issue of cheating from either the 
perspective of the cheater or the official whose duty is to detect and punish non-
compliance.5 The message to both is relatively straightforward. To the player: “Don’t 
cheat. If you cheat, you cannot win because non-compliance with the game’s 
constitutive rules effectively removes you from the game altogether.”6 To the official: 
“Apply the rules, whatever you determine them to be, in a consistent, fair, and 
unbiased manner.”7
 The indirect problem of cheating, by contrast, takes the perspective of the rule-
abiding participants. These players enter the contest under the assumption that all 
participants accept the rules as the very condition of their activity. What is their 
experience when they encounter deliberate non-compliance, and what are their 
options or obligations?
 The non-cheaters’ reactions to cheaters ref lect their respective roles. Playing 
against a cheater is a challenge that might be a test of one’s mettle and power of 
concentration in the middle of an athletic engagement. A teammate’s cheating, 
however, might present additional conf lict due to considerations of loyalty and 
practicality. The non-cheater’s moral outrage might be tempered by her teammate’s 
increased effectiveness, although the non-cheater’s awareness potentially makes her 
complicit. The problem of cheating in sport is therefore complicated because the 
non-cheater has a rooting interest in the outcome of the cheating.
4. See generally Robert Blecker, Penalties: Punishments, Prices, or Rewards?, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 251 
(2018–2019).
5. Compare Randolph M. Feezell, On the Wrongness of Cheating and Why Cheaters Can’t Play the Game, 15 J. 
Phil. Sport 57 (1988) (discussing cheating from the lens of participants), with Mitchell N. Berman, 
“Let ‘em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 Geo. L.J. 1325 (2011) (discussing the concept as it 
relates to officiating).
6. Fred D’Agostino, an early philosopher of sport, distinguished between a game’s “constitutive” rules, 
which formally define the moves and scoring, from the “regulative” rules, which stipulate penalties but 
whose violation still keeps the game intact. Fred D’Agostino, The Ethos of Games, 8 J. Phil. Sport 7, 
11–12 (1981).
7. The message to the official is more complicated because the enforcement of rules requires interpretation: 
What precisely constitutes a rule? Do the formal rules exhaustively define the enterprise, or are there 
other standards or considerations to bear in mind? Given the inevitability of errors, should an official 
attempt to correct past mistakes and thereby even the competitive playing field? Are there some rules 
that are more rigorously enforced than others, perhaps depending on the situation? See Robert Blecker, 
‘Sore Sport’ Solo Has a Point, Observer (Aug. 18, 2018), http://observer.com/2016/08/sore-sport-solo-
has-a-point (discussing the controversial nature of make-up calls in sport); see generally J.S. Russell, 
Remarks on the Progress of a Jurisprudence of Sport, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 175 (2018–2019); J.S. Russell, 
Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With?, 26 J. Phil. Sport 27 (1999).
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 The non-cheater occupies an interesting role midway between the cheater and 
the official. Like the cheater, she is subject to the rules and has no official authority 
to enforce them during the contest. But like the official, she is invested in the social 
practice that she enjoys and might be in a position to encourage compliance. 
Arguably, all participants in the social practice have a responsibility of stewardship.
III. MENS REA AND ACTUS REUS IN SPORT CHEATING
 Defining cheating can be complicated, but it is typically characterized by 1) a 
violation of an accepted rule; 2) deceit; 3) a “guilty mind”; and 4) intended and 
resulting competitive advantage.8 Whatever the definition, cheating occurs; it is 
wrong, and it presents a variety of problems for the other, non-cheating participants 
in sport. But what precisely makes cheating wrongful, and what kinds of problems 
does it create?
 To develop the analogy with criminal law, we must identify the guilty action 
(actus reus) and the guilty mind (mens rea) of sport cheating. Is every rule violation a 
guilty action, regardless of its effect on the contest? Or does a rule violation need to 
impact the competitive integrity of the event before it qualifies as cheating?
 Consider the following fictional candidates for cheating, all of whom are Major 
League Baseball players taking (or attempting to take) performance-enhancing drugs 
(PEDs):
A) A thirty-year-old player struggles in the final year of his contract. 
Prospects for a new, long-term, and lucrative contract are dim. He has had 
drug convictions in the past, but has changed his ways and is now firmly 
against taking illegal substances. He resists the suggestion that he take PEDs, 
but his personal trainer nevertheless includes them in his protein shake, and 
the player has a great final year. 
B) A frequently injured player, centrally important to the team’s success and 
making very good money for his efforts, desperately tries to play through an 
injury. He feels pressure to live up to his contract and performance level from 
previous years, and takes PEDs because he finds that they allow him to 
recover faster from his rehabilitation workouts. His personal statistics for the 
year match his career projections. 
C) A pitcher has a history of PED violations, and once served a fifty-game 
suspension. His team qualifies for the World Series this year, but he is 
struggling with both his velocity and his confidence. He asks his personal 
trainer to provide some PEDs, and the trainer agrees. But unbeknownst to 
the pitcher, the trainer disapproves of this practice and decides to inject him 
with a placebo instead. The pitcher believes he has taken PEDs; he pitches 
great and his team wins the Series.
8. I do not make any claim about which of these elements, if any, are necessary or sufficient conditions. 
Various factors could contribute to our understanding of cheating, such as the intention to gain an 
unfair advantage, the achievement of a competitive advantage, the violation of a valid rule, and other 
considerations.
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D) A player takes PEDs but does not seem to derive any benefit from them. 
He is a marginal player at best, and soon will be out of the game. He does, 
however, remain an active member of a World Series winning team.
 Although a defense could be mounted for any of these characters, they would all 
seem to be guilty of something. But none have a clear combination of a mens rea and 
an actus reus, if we understand the latter to constitute both the violation of a rule and 
the achievement of some competitive advantage. They represent different kinds of 
sport scoundrels and deserve different consequences.
 In some respects, Player A (who ingests PEDs unwittingly) is a sympathetic 
figure because he respects the authority of the rule and has apparently repented and 
changed his ways. But he violated the League rule—he upset the competitive 
dynamic with his enhanced performance. He did not have intention, but from an 
opponent’s point of view, the violation is real and should be punishable because the 
contest was compromised.
 Player B (who takes PEDs because of his injury) will plead that he did not gain a 
competitive advantage, even though he admits to taking a banned substance 
knowingly and deceptively. He might argue that he is a victim of a rule that casts its 
net too wide9: The ban on PEDs, he argues, seeks primarily to protect competitive 
integrity.10 In his case there was no threat to competitive integrity; he merely wanted 
to return to the game and his level of performance. On the other hand, injuries and 
recovery time may be considered part of the game, and any artificial speeding up of 
that process was a competitive advantage. The obligation he feels to his teammates 
may or may not compensate for the nagging feeling that cheating is wrong.
 Player C (who believes he has taken PEDs but has not) clearly intended to 
deceptively break the rules and gain a competitive advantage, but in fact did not 
violate any codified rule since he had no PEDs in his system.11 
 Player D (who took PEDs with no noticeable result) has a strong case that the 
PEDs did not help him, although he might have performed even worse without the 
drugs. He seems to combine cheating and ineptitude, which could be dismissed 
except for one detail: This player was a member of a championship team, even if not 
a major contributor. In some sports, this would threaten disqualification of the whole 
9. See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of 
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Oxford Univ. Press 1991). Schauer argues that 
all rules are suboptimal, which means they either include cases that do not come under the intention of 
the rule or exclude cases that do come under the intention of the rule. Id.
10. In fact, there are a number of justifications for the prohibition of PEDs listed in the MLB’s Joint Drug 
Agreement (JDA); among them, concern for players’ safety, fairness, and integrity of the competition. 
See Joint Drug Prevention Agreement, MLB, http://www.mlbplayers.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_
OEM_ID=34000&ATCLID=211078494 (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). The press release of the JDA 
explicitly mentions the need to “educate players on the risks associated with the use of prohibited 
substances.” Id.
11. Funnily enough, he did gain a competitive advantage by believing he had something in him that gave him 
an advantage over others, which, if one thinks about it, is a fair description of a champion’s self-image.
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team, which raises the issue of collective punishment—a complex problem in itself.12 
In Major League Baseball, a subsequent disclosure of this violation would at least 
partly taint the memory of his team’s glorious season.
 Before judging these cases, we must ask: What is the point of the rule that has 
been violated? Specifically, what constitutes the actus reus? If illicit competitive 
advantage is the sole justification for the prohibition, then perhaps we could 
understand the plea of Player B and maybe even Player D. If competitive advantage 
is not the sole purpose of the ban, intake of the drugs, regardless of their effectiveness, 
would be sufficient to pronounce guilt.
 The importance of intent also depends on the specific target of the ban. Three of 
the players (B, C, and D) intended to violate the rule, but only the latter two clearly 
intended to gain a competitive advantage. Player C intended to gain an illicit 
competitive advantage but does not in fact violate the rule. If moral blameworthiness 
is the primary concern of cheating, Player A, the trainer’s dupe who didn’t know he 
was cheating but was, is morally superior to Player C, who believed he was cheating, 
even though he wasn’t. In fact, all of the players are rule-violators and, to that extent, 
culpable, except for the agent who is arguably the worst moral character, Player C. 
Ironically, if the policy is strict liability, Player C is in the clear.
 These examples merely touch on the complexity of cheating in sport. As 
informative as the legal analogy might be, there are obvious differences between 
criminal law and sport cheating. First, in sport we assume that the players have 
voluntarily accepted the authoritative rules of the game, and any violation is a breach 
of that promise.13 Second, as we saw in the examples above, rule violations in sport 
are not always effective, so it can be difficult to identify what external act deserves 
punishment. Third, the stakes of sport and law differ; in sport, moral intention is 
more important than actual harm because violations occur within a voluntary and 
conventional social practice. The opposite holds true in law.
 In any event, in the following sections I argue that some athletic events can and 
do proceed as genuine competitions despite instances of cheating.
12. See Robert Blecker, How the Russian Doping Scandal Caused a War Between World Sporting Authorities, 
Observer (Feb. 9, 2018), https://observer.com/2018/02/court-olympics-and-anti-doping-agency-
disagree-over-russian-doping (examining collective punishment in the context of Olympic sport).
13. See J.S. Russell, Limitations of the Sport-Law Comparison, 38 J. Phil. Sport 254, 263 (2011), stating:
Given the voluntarist aspect of games, there is no similarly profound need to justify the 
exercises of coercive authority of games and game officials over game players, assuming 
the game players genuinely agree to participate in games, since game players voluntarily 
accept the constraint and enforcement of the rules by their decision to play the game. In 
this respect, games represent a simpler and fundamentally different institution for 
justifying the use of coercive authority than municipal legal systems.
 See also Steven Weimer, Consent and Right Action in Sport, 39 J. Phil. Sport 11, 12 (2012) (“[I]t is 
natural to think . . . that to consent to participate in a sport in which participants are expected to 
perform certain actions and refrain from performing other actions is to place oneself under a prima facie 
duty to conform to those expectations.”).
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IV. THE CONCEPT OF PLAYABLE CHEATING
 The concept of playable cheating confronts the “logical incompatibility thesis,” a 
formalist position which holds that cheaters do not actually play the game as it is 
defined by constitutive rules.14 Many commentators have defended versions of this 
argument: 
Rules in games thus seem to be in some sense inseparable from ends . . . . If 
the rules are broken the original end becomes impossible of attainment, since 
one cannot (really) win the game unless one plays it, and one cannot (really) 
play the game unless one obeys the rules of the game.15
 The two parenthetical qualifiers leave some conceptual space for a distinction 
between playing the game and really playing the game—space that I believe allows for 
the concept of playable cheating.
 The chief drawback of the logical incompatibility thesis would seem to be that it 
excludes too much. If accepted, countless athletic events—seasons, championships, 
records, and career statistics—would have to be wiped from the books because, at 
least in principle, even one instance of rule non-compliance by the victors would 
nullify the results.16
 But critics of the incompatibility thesis argue that rule violations do not always 
destroy games.17 For example, former MLB pitcher Gaylord Perry was widely 
suspected of throwing illegal spitballs during his long and successful career.18 
Although many pitchers are known to bend this rule, Perry appeared to f lout it—yet 
he was ejected only once in his career for ball-doctoring.19 In 1991, Perry was elected 
to the Baseball Hall of Fame after pitching more than 700 games in his career.20 As 
14. See generally William J. Morgan, The Logical Incompatibility Thesis and Rules: A Reconsideration of 
Formalism as an Account of Games, 14 J. Phil. Sport 1 (1987). 
15. Suits, supra note 2, at 24; see also Feezell, supra note 5; Edwin J. Delattre, Some Reflections on Success and 
Failure in Competitive Athletics, 2 J. Phil. Sport 133, 137 (1975); Kathleen Pearson, Deception, 
Sportsmanship, and Ethics, 19 Quest 115 (1973).
16. This formalist position in sport parallels the so-called “wrong note paradox” in music theory, which 
suggests that if even one note is misplayed by even one member of an orchestra, the work has not been 
performed, strictly speaking, because it is defined by notation. Theodore Gracyk, The Philosophy 
of Art: An Introduction 76–77 (2012); see also Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An 
Approach to a Theory of Symbols 186–87 (Bobbs-Merill Co. 1968).
17. See, e.g., Craig K. Lehman, Can Cheaters Play the Game?, 8 J. Phil. Sport 41 (1981) (rejecting the notion 
that cheating in a game is logically incompatible with winning). 
18. See Ira Berkow, Gaylord Perry: The Lonely Quest for Victory No. 300, N.Y. Times (Mar. 1, 1982), https://
www.nytimes.com/1982/03/01/sports/gaylord-perry-the-lonely-quest-for-victory-no-300.html.
19. See Jay Jaffe, A Gripping Saga: 11 Tales of Pitchers Using Spitters, Sandpaper and Scuffing, Sports 
Illustrated (May 3, 2013), https://www.si.com/mlb/strike-zone/2013/05/03/a-gripping-saga-11- 
tales-of-pitchers-using-spitters-sandpaper-and-scuffing. He even had the gall to write a book after his 
retirement. See Gaylord Perry, Me and the Spitter: An Autobiographical Confession (1974).
20. Gaylord Perry, Nat’l Baseball Hall Fame, https://baseballhall.org/hall-of-famers/perry-gaylord (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2018).
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one skeptic of the incompatibility thesis asks: “Does anyone seriously want to say 
that no baseball game [was] ever played when Perry [pitched]?”21
 Another noteworthy example is the “Deflategate” controversy.22 Allegedly, before 
the AFC championship game in January 2015, someone within the New England 
Patriots organization tampered with team footballs—deflating them slightly to make 
them easier to grip—after they had been officially measured and approved for the 
game.23 If there was a transgression, it is doubtful that it affected the outcome of the 
game: Before the second half, game officials properly re-inflated the balls, and the 
Patriots had even greater success than in the first half, scoring twenty-eight 
unanswered points and blowing the game open with a final score of 45-7.24 The 
Patriots went on to win the Super Bowl that year.25 Nevertheless, the National 
Football League, sufficiently convinced that it was “more probable than not” that 
star quarterback Tom Brady was “generally aware” of ball tampering, suspended him 
for four games the following season.26
 These examples would appear to support the criticism levied against proponents 
of the logical incompatibility thesis by suggesting that games can continue despite 
instances of cheating. But this conclusion depends on the eye of the beholder. 
Generally, there are four different perspectives to analyzing whether these examples 
are either consistent with or refute the logical incompatibility thesis.
 A strict formalist would insist that if the allegations are true, neither Gaylord 
Perry nor the New England Patriots actually played their respective games. It would 
also follow that the Patriots did not, in fact, become NFL champions. According to 
a strict formalist, these counterexamples do not show that the logical incompatibility 
thesis is incorrect; rather, they indicate a serious lapse in sport governance.
21. Lehman, supra note 17, at 42.
22. See Deflategate Timeline: After 544 Days, Tom Brady Gives In, ESPN (July 15, 2016), http://www.espn.
com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4782561/timeline-of-events-for-def lategate-tom-brady. 
23. See id.; see also Chris Mortensen, 11 of 12 Pats Footballs Underinflated, ESPN (Jan. 21, 2015), http://
www.espn.com/boston/nfl/story/_/id/12202450/nfl-says-new-england-patriots-had-inf lated-footballs-
afc-championship-game. Skeptics and critics point to the National Football League itself as the cheaters 
for having doctored its findings and distorted the science on which it was purportedly based. Cf. Four 
Games in Fall (Lemon Martini Productions 2017); Brief of Professors of Physics and Eng’g as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing en Banc, by John Leonard et 
al., Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 
2016) (No. 15-2801); Brief for Professor Robert Blecker as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, id. 
(No. 15-2801).
24. See Deflategate Timeline, supra note 22.
25. See id.
26. See id.; see also Theodore V. Wells, Jr. et al., Investigative Report Concerning Footballs 
Used During the AFC Championship Game on January 18, 2015 2, https://nf llabor.f iles.
wordpress.com/2015/05/investigative-and-expert-reports-re-footballs-used-during-afc-championsh.
pdf. Assuming the report was accurate, I would argue that Brady cheated and most of the players on the 
field were aware of it. I would also argue that it was playable.
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 A second approach, which I call interpretive formalism, recognizes difficult 
cases, much like H.L.A. Hart’s explanation of “penumbral cases” in law.27 This 
position argues that throwing spitballs, although technically outlawed, is part of 
baseball ’s conventions. Therefore, it is not genuine cheating and the logical 
incompatibility thesis still holds true. One does not cheat when playing within the 
customs of the game.28
 Whereas the first two positions maintain the incompatibility thesis, the anti-
formalist position effectively denies it. Under this third approach, instead of 
attempting to reconcile the behavior in question with the spirit of the rules through 
an interpretive effort, the anti-formalist acknowledges that the rule has been broken; 
everybody knows it goes on and implicitly accepts it.29 This view claims that what 
people call cheating is actually part of the fascination of sport: Successful cheaters 
are savvy competitors deserving of our admiration.30
 The fourth position, institutional formalism, is the premise of my discussion and 
also denies the logical incompatibility thesis. It holds that despite clear instances of 
cheating, some games are nevertheless recognizable and legitimate if the basic 
activity of the contest is not fatally compromised. Institutional formalism agrees with 
strict formalism and anti-formalism that a rule violation is genuine cheating; 
institutional formalism also agrees with interpretive formalism and anti-formalism 
that the contest can often continue despite rule violations. Whereas anti-formalism 
thinks violations might “spice up” the contest, institutional formalism argues that the 
contest can tolerate and absorb some degree of rule-breaking. Of course, every 
determination depends on specifics. Every game would seem to have some threshold 
level of compliance, without which the event would be impossible. If there is enough 
compliance—or at least enough apparent compliance—for a game to proceed, I 
suggest it presents the possibility of playable cheating.31
27. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 607–08 (1958) 
(“There must be a core of settled meaning [of a particular law], but there will be, as well, a penumbra of 
debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.”).
28. Feezell, supra note 5, at 5. Because Feezell likely did not want to compromise the validity of the logical 
incompatibility thesis, he had to redefine what qualifies as cheating.
29. Oliver Leaman, Cheating and Fair Play in Sport, in Ethics in Sport 153, 153–59 (William J. Morgan 
ed., 3d ed. 2018). I think we can distinguish two different senses of rules: the codified guideline and the 
actual practice. When one goes outside of the latter it is considered immoral and unacceptable.
30. Id. at 156–57. Leaman states:
It might be suggested that many competitions, especially those with some sort of 
authority present to regulate cheating, would be more interesting if cheating takes place 
within it, or if several players try to stretch the rules. Such deviant behavior adds a new 
dimension to the game which can also add to its interest.
 Id. at 157. His position is not amoral, however, because Leaman insists that this wider understanding of 
sport is still governed by the principle of fairness: “The existence of an authority in sport enshrines 
cheating in the structure of the game; the authority is there to ensure that cheating does not interfere 
with the principle of fairness in a game.” Id. at 158.
31. My terminology might be different, but I do not think the concept that I suggest here is particularly 
novel. Other commentators generally describe minor violations as something other than cheating, but 
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 As an early proponent of the incompatibility thesis once proclaimed, cheaters are 
not “really” playing, a precision that seems to suggest a sense in which they are indeed 
playing.32 Although the cheater resembles someone engaged in the activity of the 
contest, strictly speaking, his violation disqualifies that activity. In principle, the 
cheater would defeat his own purpose were he to destroy the game altogether, because 
then he could not collect his sought-after, unmerited award. So he occupies a self-
defeating position: He needs the appearance of a legitimate contest for his award to 
have any meaning, and yet his actions may objectively destroy the contest. The 
cheater must operate within the game’s institution, hence “institutional formalism.”33
 The game’s institution provides a general standard according to which we 
distinguish playable from unplayable cheating, although it raises two important 
questions. First, can the game continue despite these violations? Is the game’s 
institution, in other words, sufficiently recognizable and intact to allow for play?34 A 
“yes” to this question will prompt the second question—the moral question—which 
is, should the game continue? That question turns on how the non-cheater considers 
his relationship to the cheaters and, indeed, his participation in the game. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PLAYABLE CHEATING
 There are, of course, many types of cheating outside of sport: cheating on 
examinations, on taxes, on spouses, on diets. We might consider whether there is 
some core value that cheating harms. I suggest that there are two basic paradigms. 
 First, cheating can involve an attempt to gain an unfair advantage in a contest, or 
produce an inaccurate measurement in a performance.35 The core value here is 
they, too, draw a distinction between major violations that are destructive of events and minor violations 
that are not. See Russell, supra note 3, at 316 (“It is more accurate to say that sometimes cheating destroys 
a game or a contest, as when a coach manages to rig the judging of an event. But I suspect that many 
instances of cheating create imperfections in games though they do not destroy them.”). Earlier 
discussions also acknowledge the possibility of some non-compliance in otherwise legitimate events, but 
they do so by downplaying the seriousness of the violations, as if to say they are not really instances of 
cheating. See Feezell supra note 5, at 61 (using the term “subtle illegalities” that have become embedded 
in baseball); J.S. Russell, Play and the Moral Limits of Sport, in Ethics in Sport, supra note 29, at 208–
22 (using the term “competitive shenanigans”). I find myself in agreement with these positions, but I 
prefer to retain the language of cheating because it presents the moral issue more clearly.
32. See Suits, supra note 2, at 24.
33. See id. at 46 (“Thus, although he is not really playing the game, he has not abandoned the game’s 
institution. On the contrary, his continuing to operate in terms of the institution is a necessary condition 
for his exploitation of the game and his opponent.”).
34. Ironically, successful deception on the part of a savvy cheater might actually allow the game to continue. 
35. There are different types of athletic events that present the problem of unfair cheating in different ways. 
Some events, such as football and basketball, are directly interactive contests. Others, such as swimming 
and gymnastics, are individual performances that seek to outdo other performances. One can cheat in 
an attempt to gain an unfair advantage over opponents in both of these events, but the cheating 
manifests itself differently according to the structure of the event. In either case, the moral issue is 
similar, although the manner is quite different. Bernard Suits discusses this contrast: 
The Olympics (as well as the Commonwealth Games, and so on) contain two distinct 
types of competitive event, what I have elsewhere called judged as opposed to refereed 
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fairness. Correlatively, with respect to mens rea, we would specifically blame the 
intention to surreptitiously gain an advantage to skew the results of the contest. 
 Second, cheating can violate a commitment that created a new relationship or 
grouping, such as a marriage or the social practice of a sport. The core value here is 
fidelity. The wrongness of cheating has less to do with advantages and more to do 
with the damage and disrespect that non-compliance represents. We are offended by 
this breach even if no advantage follows from it.
 We might wonder if there is a relationship between these paradigms. Fidelity 
seems to be more of a deontological notion—an imperative rather than a value that 
could be measured or balanced against other values. On the other hand, the fairness 
paradigm, although intelligible in itself, might well presuppose the fidelity paradigm 
on some level. People who cheat on their taxes, for example, attempt to gain an 
unfair economic advantage over other taxpayers, but the real offense is the disregard 
for the implicit social contract that sustains that practice.
 This mixed paradigm involving the values of both fairness and fidelity helps us 
understand the nature of cheating in sport. Their relationship reflects what many 
point out—namely, that competitive sport presupposes cooperation as a ground of 
that antagonistic encounter.36 The conceptual priority of cooperation vis-à-vis 
competition parallels the basis that fidelity provides to concerns for fairness.
 Recall the logical incompatibility thesis. The thesis does not itself imply the 
wrongfulness of cheating; it simply makes the analytical point that non-compliance—
whether intentional or not—disqualifies one from participation.37 The wrongfulness 
of cheating derives from the promise one makes that he will play that game. Cheating 
in sport is not only unfair but it also breaks faith; it ruptures to some extent this new 
social ontology created by the promise.
 The type of cheating that most naturally lends itself to this discussion involves 
deceit—a participant pretends to comply with the rules and does so rather 
convincingly to most observers, including the officials. But not all cheating in sport 
is deceptive. There is brazen cheating, such as a boss who moves his ball to a better 
lie at the company golf tournament, or, more maliciously, a bully who openly 
disregards the rules. There is also calculated cheating, which includes open violations, 
events. One is a performance and so requires judges. The other is not a performance but 
a rule-governed interplay of participants, and so requires not judges but law-enforcement 
officers, that is, referees. Performances require rehearsal, games require practice. 
 Bernard Suits, Tricky Triad: Games, Play, and Sport, 15 J. Phil. Sport 1, 2 (1988). 
36. See, e.g., Robert L. Simon, Cesar R. Torres & Peter F. Hager, Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport 
59–80 (Westview Press 4th ed. 2015); R. Scott Kretchmar, From Test to Contest: An Analysis of Two 
Kinds of Counterpoint in Sport, 2 J. Phil. Sport 23 (1975); Scott Kretchmar, Competition, Redemption, 
and Hope, 39 J. Phil. Sport 101, 103 (2012) (“Sport becomes a mutual quest for excellence, a collaborative 
search for knowledge, a cooperative journey in search of riveting drama, an inclusive laboratory for human 
development.”).
37. See Lehman, supra note 17, at 41. According to the nature of the contest, the disqualification of one 
participant might effectively end the contest. For example, one cannot play tennis against someone who 
is not playing tennis. But in other sports, such as track and field or golf, a single elimination does not 
affect the general competition.
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perhaps usually as desperate measures that seem worth the risk, even if one might 
hope that they will not be detected by the officials. Examples include a deliberate 
handball in soccer to prevent a goal, or a defensive back in American football holding 
a wide receiver to prevent an easy touchdown pass.38 Open cheating might be 
playable, but poses different conceptual issues for the integrity of games.39
 Generally speaking, deception makes all wrongdoing worse by adding dishonesty 
to the mix. But the brazen, open cheater does not even pretend to respect or 
acknowledge equal standing before the rules, which might turn the encounter into 
something rather different than sport. Deception, as bad as it is, might actually allow 
a game to continue as playable—not only as a matter of appearances, but also because 
the deceptive cheater implicitly accepts the premise of fair play, which is why he 
hides his violations.40 In this qualified sense, the deceptive cheater is more respectful 
than the open cheater.
VI. WHEN TEAMMATES CHEAT
 The relationship teammates share is multi-dimensional. As competitors, they are 
invested in each other’s athletic efforts, even though they have separable roles. They 
also have personal relationships as a consequence of their time together. They are 
often friends, and older teammates may serve as mentors to younger teammates. To 
some extent, their actions and their attitudes reflect upon one another, and fairly or 
unfairly, outsiders might assume complicity when a team member cheats. So what 
should a player do when she becomes aware that a teammate is cheating? 
 Teams are comprised of individuals with separate intentions and responsibilities, 
who can each be assessed individually. But teams are not simply collections of 
individual agencies. A team is a “plural subject,” which means that members think of 
themselves reflexively as a unit and act accordingly.41 For this reason, a teammate’s 
behavior is never wholly separable from the rest, even if it does not imply something 
like collective guilt.
 The non-cheater might be genuinely outraged by the behavior and desire to correct 
it out of respect for the game. But there are good moral reasons to hesitate—the 
integrity of the contest is not the only value at stake here, however important it is. 
Private admonitions are a delicate matter, and whistle-blowing, even if only internally, 
would likely have a devastating effect on team morale. Loyalty is a foundational moral 
38. Even without deception, it is difficult to deny the cheating spirit of these examples. See Russell, supra 
note 3, at 309–10. 
39. This is not a theoretical claim; it is a practical judgment about whether or not the rule violations have 
sufficiently compromised the contest. For example, a game would be unplayable if the skills that 
normally decide the contest are no longer able to overcome the cheating activity.
40. The appearance of rule compliance helps makes the game playable, even if morally bad. If the officials, 
players, and spectators all think the game is proceeding normally (which might require a certain level of 
skill on the part of the cheater), the game can go on. 
41. Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts 2–3 (Princeton Univ. Press 1989).
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value in all group dynamics, especially one in which members interact so closely.42 We 
must also assume that the non-cheater, however principled, shares the competitive 
commitment of his teammates. To negatively impact the team’s collective efforts should 
give one pause; as with any instance of whistle-blowing, the correct decision requires 
consideration of the circumstances of the case and good prudential judgment. Further, 
the non-cheater may not fully understand the context of the apparent violation. Some 
instances of cheating may be responses to the cheating of opponents.43 Such 
considerations give principled reasons to overlook some transgressions.
 Moral considerations aside, the non-cheater has practical reasons to intervene 
due to worries about penalties or disqualification. Cheating puts everyone on the 
team in danger of some kind; an appeal to the common self-interest is both 
understandable and justified.44 A concern expressing practical worries is probably less 
offensive to the cheater precisely because it is not a moral, authoritative judgment 
from a peer. The practical concern might not jeopardize the team dynamic and could 
even reinforce it if the non-cheater appeals to common interest.
 A teammate’s cheating also presents a (quasi) legal worry: To what extent does 
interaction with a cheating teammate implicate the non-cheater? If we consider 
cheating in sport as analogous to a legal crime, at what point does a teammate’s 
interaction amount to complicity?45 Complicity is a relational concept; by definition 
it involves two or more agents, one of whom is the principal whose action constitutes 
the original crime.46 The legal doctrine of complicity stands as a complement to the 
doctrine of causation.47 Both actors are blameworthy, but in different ways.48 In a 
dissenting opinion in a 2005 Colorado case, Justice Michael Bender stated:
42. See generally Paul Gaffney, The Nature and Meaning of Teamwork, 42 J. Phil. Sport 1 (2015).
43. For example, if an opposing baseball player is stealing signs it might warrant a response outside the rules 
to prevent it. See S.K. Wertz, The Varieties of Cheating, 8 J. Phil. Sport 19, 24–27 (1981) (discussing the 
concept of retaliatory cheating).
44. Consider the Jamaican relay team that was stripped of its 2008 Olympic gold medal because one 
member was discovered to have violated the International Olympic Committee drug policy. See Colin 
Dwyer, Usain Bolt Loses a Gold Medal After 2008 Teammate’s Failed Test, NPR (Jan. 25, 2017), https://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/25/511605094/usain-bolt-loses-a-gold-medal-after-2008-
teammates-failed-test. 
45. Complicity is a legal concept, although it has an analogous moral sense as well. The term has pervaded 
the news in recent years: According to Dictionary.com, “complicit” was the word of the year for 2017. 
Word of the Year 2017, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/e/word-of-the-year (last visited 
Nov. 9, 2018).
46. See Grissom v. People, 115 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Colo. 2005) (en banc) (“Complicity is not a separate and 
distinct crime or offense. Rather, it is ‘a theory by which a defendant becomes accountable for a criminal 
offense committed by another.’”) (quoting People v. Thompson, 655 P.2d 416, 418 (Colo. 1982)).
47. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 Calif. 
L. Rev. 323, 327 (1985) (“Complicity emerges as a separate ground of liability because causation 
doctrine cannot in general satisfactorily deal with results that take the form of another’s voluntary 
action.”).
48. Id. at 337.
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To prove that a defendant is complicit in the commission of a crime, the 
prosecution must prove a dual mental state before the complicitor may be held 
legally accountable for the offense of another. The complicitor must have: (1) 
the culpable mental state required for the underlying crime committed by the 
principal; and (2) the intent to promote or facilitate the crime committed by 
the principal.49 
This description indicates that complicity involves something more than mere 
association with the criminal but something less than actual causation. The 
complicitor must do something that can be construed as assistance, support, or 
encouragement:
It is important not to misconstrue derivative liability as imparting vicarious 
liability. Accomplice liability does not involve imposing liability on one party 
for the wrongs of another solely because of the relationship between the 
parties. Liability requires action by the secondary actor—as we shall see, 
intentional action designed to persuade or help—that makes it appropriate to 
blame him for what the primary actor does.50
 How do these descriptions apply to a player on a team sport? Membership on a 
team is more than an association. Teammates have a common project; they coordinate 
their efforts and they are invested in each other’s success. At the same time, they 
perform as individual actors and carry separable responsibilities. Teammates spend a 
great deal of time together, both on and off the field, and generally become very 
familiar with each other’s activities and habits. Secrets are hard to keep in such close 
quarters. It is likely that teammates become aware of any illicit activity when it 
occurs—either before the action begins, as the action unfolds, or after it has taken 
place. In general, omission to act does not imply criminal liability, except in special 
cases where there is a pre-existing duty such as the failure to look after children in 
one’s care.51 A similar presumption undoubtedly holds true in the case of sport 
cheating with respect to complicity, although knowledge does perhaps imply some 
practical responsibility.
 One may be complicit if one encourages an actor to commit an act he would 
otherwise be less motivated to do:
If one persuades or encourages another to commit a criminal act by appealing 
to some consideration that moves him, by giving him emotional support and 
approval, by offering a rationalization for the action, or by similar means, one 
has not caused the principal to act in the physical sense of cause.52
 What does encouragement mean in team sport? One might imagine how pressure 
from teammates and coaches to perform at a certain level holds out the promise of 
greater acceptance and increased playing time. The competitive spirit and the sense 
49. Grissom, 115 P.3d at 1288 (Bender, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
50. Kadish, supra note 47, at 337. Presumably, the meaning of the word “action” used by Kadish includes 
some types of inaction or omission.
51. See Model Penal Code § 2.07 (Am. Law. Inst. 2017).
52. Kadish, supra note 47, at 344.
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of obligation teammates feel to one another can certainly contribute to the violation 
of rules, particularly if the cheater observes that his teammates are aware of his 
transgression but have not intervened to remedy it or to prevent its repetition in the 
future.
 Facilitation, however, is more than mere encouragement; it involves some kind of 
practical agency, although not as much to qualify as causation. The transgression is 
that of the principal, but there is some kind of assistance. “The problem of the 
secondary party’s liability does arise where one of the parties commits all the acts 
necessary for the crime and the other commits none of these acts but renders some 
assistance, typically by providing the means or opportunity.”53
 Some sports require a more intimate interaction with teammates than others, and 
even within some sports there is a significant positional difference.54 For example, 
catchers who worked with Gaylord Perry cannot credibly claim to have been 
uninvolved with his cheating because they must have known which pitches were 
coming. On the other hand, a center-fielder would be less involved; although players 
in the field sometimes reposition themselves based on pitching strategy, they are 
further removed from the pitcher’s tactics than the catcher. 
 The observance of a teammate cheating might call for the exercise of leadership. 
Much depends, however, on a player’s status on the team. For example, it might be 
difficult for a team member to confront the team’s star player—any expression of 
disapproval could bring unpleasant consequences, maybe a benching or even a trade. 
 But consider a different team dynamic. In 2014, New York Yankees pitcher 
Michael Pineda was thrown out of a game against the Boston Red Sox for using pine 
tar, a strictly forbidden substance.55 The violation was evident to television viewers.56 
In the photographs published after the game, Derek Jeter, former captain of the 
Yankees and five-time World Series champion, can be seen surrounding Pineda on 
the mound with his teammates.57 A respected veteran like Jeter was in a position to 
help a young teammate like Pineda understand that using pine tar is not the right 
way to play the game, if only as a matter of prudence. Pineda was ultimately ejected 
from the game.58 General Manager Brian Cashman admitted team responsibility: 
“We certainly are responsible. There’s certainly failure on our part as an organization 
as a whole that he took the field in the second inning with that on his neck. He’s 
responsible for his actions, but we failed as an organization for . . . him being in that 
position.”59
53. Id. at 345.
54. Gaffney, supra note 42, at 16–17.
55. Bryan Hoch, Pineda Ejected for Having Pine Tar on Neck, MLB News (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.mlb.
com/news/yankees-right-hander-michael-pineda-ejected-for-having-pine-tar-on-neck/c-73145346. 
56. Id.





 Perhaps the most famous case of how the actions of teammates can negatively 
affect the whole unit is the so-called “Black Sox Scandal” of 1919, when members of 
the Chicago White Sox decided to throw the World Series against the Cincinnati 
Reds in exchange for money from a gambling syndicate led by Arnold Rothstein.60 
The players were generally dissatisfied with their salaries, but according to most 
accounts they were not united in their decision to throw the series.61
 The most famous player involved was “Shoeless” Joe Jackson, a hall-of-fame 
caliber hitter and the star of the White Sox team.62 Controversy exists even today 
about his knowledge and intent in the midst of the scandal.63 He never attended any 
meetings about the plan and some suggest that, because he was illiterate, he did not 
have access to some of the materials they shared.64 Even though he hit .375 and had 
the only homer in the Series,65 Jackson was later found guilty, and received a 
permanent ban from Major League Baseball activities, including honors such as the 
Hall of Fame.66 In his decision to permanently ban eight players from the league, the 
commissioner reasoned:
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player [who] throws a ball game; no 
player [who] undertakes or promises to throw a ball game; no player [who] 
sits in a conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where the 
ways and means of throwing games are planned and discussed and does not 
promptly tell his club about it, will ever play professional baseball.67
 This is a sad baseball story. It does not involve an attempt to gain an unfair 
advantage in the game, but it does demonstrate how wrongdoings in team sport have 
a sweeping effect on everyone in the room. What is vividly true in team sport is 
reflected to some degree in all human associations. Depending on our relationships, 
we participate in the actions of others, both as beneficiaries and victims, even if we 
do not commit them as primary actors. Sport provides a suggestive analogy for the 
social implications of what goes on around us.68
60. Evan Andrews, The Black Sox Baseball Scandal, History (Oct. 9, 2014), https://www.history.com/news/
the-black-sox-baseball-scandal-95-years-ago. 
61. Id.




65. Id.; Shoeless Joe Jackson, Baseball Reference, https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/j/jacksjo01.
shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2018). 
66. See Andrews, supra note 60; Pruitt, supra note 62.
67. Sportscenter Flashback: The Chicago Black Sox Banned from Baseball, ESPN Classic (Nov. 19, 2003), 
http://www.espn.com/classic/s/black_sox_moments.html. 
68. George Herbert Mead used a baseball example to describe the social character of human nature: 
Each one of own his acts is determined by his assumption of the action of the others who 
are playing the game. What he does is controlled by his being everyone else on that team, at 
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VII. WHEN OPPONENTS CHEAT
 The question of guilt or complicity does not normally arise when playing against 
a cheating opponent.69 Whatever success the non-cheater achieves is without moral 
taint. But the opponent’s cheating presumably makes success all the more difficult to 
achieve, and might even be the difference between winning and losing. Overcoming 
the additional obstacle might be a particularly satisfying resolution to the issue, 
although not fully satisfying in the true spirit of sport.70 Such a victory overcomes 
the unfairness of cheating, but does not repair the bad faith.
 There is an obvious difference between officiated and pick-up games. In the former, 
one can always appeal to authorities and ask them to enforce the rules, although this is 
not always effective. Some cheating—for example, holding opponents in contact 
sports—is difficult to detect when done by a skilled cheater. Another complication is 
that a player might be hesitant to make such an appeal if his teammate is thought to be 
using similar tactics, presenting the issue of who will cast the first stone.71
 On the other hand, pick-up games must be self-governing, and for that reason 
would seem to require a more genuinely moral commitment among the players. In 
these games, we often are familiar with our opponents, which further complicates 
the social dynamic and gives rise to non-deceptive cheating. We can imagine 
instances when a boss or a grandfather takes some liberties on a golf course, knowing 
full well that no one will say anything.
 A much more unpleasant instance is when the relationship approaches hostility, 
nearing the point of event destruction. When this occurs it fundamentally transforms 
the activity. What was previously an autotelic engagement—a game played for its 
own sake—now becomes a means through which a very different kind of struggle 
takes place. Competitive athletes at some point in their careers, whether on the local 
playground or at the professional level, need to confront displays of gamesmanship, 
as if “playing one game to win another.”72 It is not always clear that it is worth the 
least in so far as those attitudes affect his own particular response. We get then an 
“other” which is an organization of the attitudes of those involved in the same process.
 George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society 154 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934) (emphasis 
added).
69. For the sake of simplicity, I am here taking for granted that competitors go into contests fully committed 
to winning. In some instances, however, a team might deliberately try to lose, possibly because of 
considerations of a more favorable draw later in a tournament. An example of this behavior occurred in 
the 2012 Olympics when eight badminton players attempted to secure an easier draw in the Games. 
Olympic Badminton: Eight Women Disqualified from Doubles, BBC Sport (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.
bbc.com/sport/olympics/19072677. Their intention was discovered and they were rightfully disqualified 
from the tournament. Id.
70. All games by definition seek to overcome unnecessary obstacles, but the additional unnecessary obstacle 
of overcoming a rule violation is not strictly part of any game or sport. See Suits, supra note 2, at 41.
71. For example, a week before Michael Pineda was ejected for using pine tar, it was obvious he was doing 
the exact same thing against the same team. See Hoch, supra note 55. But the Boston Red Sox did not 
call attention to it until it became too blatant to ignore, and for a very good reason: Their pitchers 
sometimes use pine tar themselves, particularly in cold weather. Id.
72. Leslie A. Howe, Gamesmanship, 31 J. Phil. Sport 212, 212 (2004). 
214
PLAYING WITH CHEATERS
effort, particularly when the opposition demonstrates contempt for the integrity of 
the social practice.
 Perhaps the non-cheater, driven by a healthy competitive spirit and finding herself 
locked in this kind of struggle, instead decides to engage in “retaliatory cheating.”73 
One could make the argument that this is not cheating at all and that it simply levels 
the playing field, although it does so by altering the game in some manner.
Do we look with moral indignation upon the player who cheats to make the 
opponent stop cheating him or her? No, we might not; we might take this 
action as an attempt to restore the playworld. The restoration might be 
thought of as more important than the specific act of cheating which brought 
it about.74
 Arguably, this should be understood as an attempt to promote competitive 
fairness, which might be accepted as one of the unwritten rules of the game: 
Cheating in some instances seems to be approved by people; retaliatory cheating 
is a good example. This kind of cheating involves a covert set of norms, because 
established social norms dictate against it. But we also find cases where 
retaliatory cheating is approved. This is rather like “beating the system.”75
 Here we recall the anti-formalist position suggesting that the presence of officials 
“enshrine[s] cheating in the structure of the game,” which only adds to its intrigue.76 
The phenomenon of retaliatory cheating can be understood as a perfect example of 
how reciprocal violations exploit the plastic character of constitutive rules without 
compromising the overriding principle of fairness. Cheaters creatively manipulate 
the game, but as long as officials oversee the action, and presumably as long as the 
opponents have an equal opportunity to respond, the essential character of 
competitive sport is maintained.
 The idea of unofficial, retaliatory actions in sport might find an analogy in what 
is called “legal pluralism,” which could be considered a practical solution to 
overcrowded courtrooms: “Just as health is not found primarily in hospitals or 
knowledge in schools, so justice is not primarily to be found in official justice-
dispensing institutions. . . . Courts (and other official agencies) comprise only one 
hemisphere of the world of regulating and disputing.”77 The players themselves can 
check the opposition’s cheating better than officials—they are closer to the action, 
their perception is more accurate (although less impartial), and often they can rectify 
violations in the normal f low of the game.
73. Wertz, supra note 43, at 25, 35.
74. Id. at 33.
75. Id. at 35. One might go into a contest fully prepared to comply with the rules, but also savvy enough to 
protect oneself in the event of non-compliance by others. It suggests someone saying, “Oh, you want to 
play that game?”
76. Leaman, supra note 29, at 158.
77. Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. Legal 
Pluralism 1, 17, 34 (1981). 
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 Retaliation could have a number of effects: It might embolden, enrage, or escalate 
the situation. And there is, of course, always the possibility that the one who believes 
herself to be retaliating against a previous wrong has misjudged the situation and is 
in fact initiating the trouble. Despite all these worries, we can understand the urge to 
retaliate because two fundamental principles—competitive drive and stewardship—
are put into conflict. In fact, we could understand the defense of the retaliator who 
insisted that her response was an attempt to align these principles. We must 
remember that however noble the non-cheater is, and however much she cares to 
protect the practice, she did not come to the field of play to make a moral statement. 
She came to compete.78
VIII. CONCLUSION
 First, playable cheating does not imply that that the results are set in stone 
because the event can continue or indeed did continue to completion. One might 
have to play under a cloud of uncertainty; authorities may decide after the event that 
violations were serious enough to change or nullify the results, which is never a fully 
satisfactory outcome. But it happens, and sometimes, it should happen.79
 Second, “playable” as contrasted with “unplayable” is not tantamount to minor 
versus consequential. Some instances of playable cheating are seriously wrong, and 
some instances might be significant enough to decide a contest. After all, why cheat 
if it does not put you in a better position to perform better or possibly win?
 Third, it is fair to ask whether the institutional standard of playability works, 
because it relies so much on appearances. This standard, which posits that a contest 
can continue so long as the game is not fatally disrupted by the violations, begs a host 
of questions: Precisely what qualifies as a fatal disruption? Is the institutional 
standard satisfied as long as the game sufficiently resembles a contest played strictly 
according to the rules? Does this understanding of playability ask everyone to ignore 
that others, teammates or opponents, are cheating and getting away with it? 
Participants might be willing to do this for the sake of having a game, however 
f lawed, but that reasoning should not persuade critical minds. Philosophy as a 
discipline begins with a systematic distinction between appearances and reality, so 
even if the cheater appears to be operating within an institutional structure, the 
game is still not fully legitimate. The formalist position is not easily dismissed.
78. Some sports might allow us to play with cheaters if we distinguish between playing and competing. For 
example, in a race I might choose to ignore my opponent’s suspicious activities—like cutting corners on 
a distance race—and concentrate simply on achieving my personal best. The same might be true in 
other performance sports, such as golf, where I can focus on the challenge of the test itself. See R. Scott 
Kretchmar, supra note 2. But of course, this greatly diminishes the sense in which one plays with or 
against others.
79. A good example is the 100-meter final in the 1988 Olympics in Seoul. Ben Johnson apparently won the 
race, but was later disqualified. All the other sprinters ran the race as they normally would, and many of 
them probably knew that Johnson was taking steroids. Andrea Mann, September 27, 1988: Ben Johnson Is 





 It is undeniable that the events discussed in this essay—contests that are impacted 
by illegal steroid usage, tampering with equipment, and undetected rule violations—
are tainted and compromised affairs. They fall short of the sport ideal. But we live in 
a world where the mental toughness required to become a champion or optimal 
performer may well include mastering dealing with low blows. No doubt, it is 
sometimes appropriate to throw up one’s hands and declare, “No game!” But it is 
sometimes necessary to play through it. Perhaps cheating is not part of the game, 
strictly speaking, but playing with cheaters probably is.
